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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal arises out of a bizarre factual situation that 
reads like the plot of a Grade B melodrama. It requires us 
to interpret several statutes that protect the integrity of 
federal criminal investigations. The government has 
understandably attempted to find a law that criminalizes 
the conduct of defendant Vincent Davis, which is as 
reprehensible as it is unusual. In the process, however, the 
government has stretched several laws beyond their 
breaking points. We conclude that the evidence adduced at 
Davis's trial was insufficient to convict him of obstruction 
of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, or use of a 
telephone in aid of racketeering activity (violation of a New 
York statute prohibiting receipt of any benefit for violation 
of official duty). Nonetheless, Davis's conduct is not beyond 
the reach of federal law: There was sufficient evidence to 
convict him of witness tampering. We are persuaded, 
however, that he was entitled to an instruction on his 
intoxication defense to that charge and that the District 
Court's refusal to give such an instruction requires that he 
be given a new trial. Since Davis may be retried on the 
witness tampering counts, we resolve his objections to 
several of the District Court's evidentiary rulings. Because 
of our disposition of Davis's claims, we need not address 
his challenges to his sentence. 
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I. Facts 
 
At the time of the relevant events, Davis was an officer 
with the New York Transit Police, although he was 
terminated in February 1997 following his indictment in the 
present case. Davis married Diane Pelatti in 1983, and the 
two were divorced in March 1994. Richard Sabol is a career 
criminal with lifelong ties to organized crime families. He 
and Diane Pelatti had dated in high school, and Davis 
testified that, when Pelatti and Sabol broke up, Sabol 
threatened to throw acid in her face and cut off herfingers. 
He also threatened Davis and Davis's family when Davis 
began to date Pelatti. Davis plainly developed an obsession 
with Sabol. On his own initiative, he attended Sabol's 1986 
sentencing in New York for credit card fraud; obtained a 
copy of Sabol's "rap sheet"; and discussed Sabol with Agent 
Ronald Geer, an agent for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation ("FBI"), who was present at the 1986 
sentencing hearing. 
 
In 1992, Sabol was convicted in Georgia on federal drug 
charges. Davis learned of Sabol's Georgia arrest in a 
roundabout fashion: In early 1992, he received a 
threatening phone call from a person he believed to be 
Sabol. He then contacted Agent Geer to find out whether 
Sabol could have made the call. Geer told him about the 
Georgia crime and stated that Sabol was going to prison for 
many years. What Geer did not tell Davis was that Sabol 
had become an informant in a Georgia investigation, for 
which he received a sentence reduction. 
 
In late 1992, the U.S. Customs Service ("Customs") 
decided to use Sabol in the New York/New Jersey area to 
infiltrate the Giampa Crew, which was a branch of the 
Lucchese crime family. Sabol was acquainted with Gennaro 
Vittorio, who hoped to become a "made man" in the Giampa 
Crew. Vittorio's stepfather was Joseph Giampa, from whom 
the Crew took its name. Customs used Sabol in a ruse 
whereby Sabol told Vittorio and others that he was on work 
release and offered to engage in various illegal activities. 
 
From October 1993 to January 1994, Sabol gained 
Vittorio's confidence and also met others in the Crew. They 
engaged in several small-scale transactions in allegedly 
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stolen merchandise, and also traded illegal guns and a 
small amount of heroin. These transactions were captured 
on video and audio surveillance. Sabol provided Vittorio 
and others in the Crew with cell phones, which became 
subject to a wiretap order on January 13, 1994. 
 
Meanwhile, Davis heard from various acquaintances that 
Sabol was back in town. In view of Sabol's former 
relationship with his wife, this information made Davis 
extremely upset, especially as he was having marital 
difficulties. One of the people who warned him that Sabol 
had returned was Michael Lanteri ("Michael"), who was 
married to Maria Lanteri ("Maria"), Davis's sister. Michael 
and Vittorio were childhood friends, and Michael saw 
Vittorio with Sabol. Because Davis knew that Sabol's 
Georgia conviction should have kept him in prison for many 
years, Davis inferred that Sabol must have been 
cooperating with the authorities in order to get a sentence 
reduction. 
 
Vittorio, who was ignorant of Sabol's Georgia history, 
became confident enough of Sabol's criminal tendencies 
that he sought to use Sabol to establish an import/export 
business in New Jersey to import drugs and export stolen 
vehicles. He gave Sabol $10,000 for this purpose on 
January 24, 1994. On January 25, 1994, however, Michael 
called Vittorio. He explained that he could not speak on the 
phone but insisted that Vittorio come to the Lanteris' 
apartment because Michael had important information for 
him. Moments later, Maria also phoned Vittorio and 
repeated Michael's urgings. Soon thereafter, Vittorio used 
his tapped cell phone to call James McManus, a member of 
the Giampa Crew, and stated that he could not talk on the 
cell phone because "there is a lot of static right now," but 
that he would page McManus from a pay phone, which 
McManus should then call. This was the first indication 
that the Customs investigation was souring. 
 
As later testimony would show, Vittorio began to distance 
himself from Sabol because, at the Lanteris', Michael told 
him that he was being set up, that Sabol had been arrested 
for a serious crime and should not be out on the street, and 
that Vittorio's crimes were being captured on tape. Vittorio 
asked how Michael knew all this, and, after some initial 
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reluctance, Michael explained that Davis told him. Vittorio 
wanted to speak to Davis, whom he knew from the Lanteris' 
engagement party, so he went to Davis's house. Davis was 
drunk and paranoid, and he warned Vittorio that Sabol was 
a "rat," which Vittorio took to mean that Sabol might be 
wearing a wire, giving information to the authorities, or 
testifying in order to get a reduction in sentence. 
 
In order to back up his story, Davis showed Vittorio a 
piece of paper with a federal prosecutor's name and Agent 
Geer's name on it. He told Vittorio that he had a good 
source for his information, an FBI agent, and that there 
was "just no way" that Sabol could be on the street without 
being an informant. Vittorio told Davis that Sabol had given 
him cell phones, and Davis responded that they were 
definitely tapped. He warned Vittorio that Sabol would 
testify against Vittorio. Vittorio testified that Davis told him 
to "do something about it" and that Davis asked him for a 
gun. Although Vittorio later broached the idea of killing 
Sabol to his stepfather, the stepfather immediately vetoed 
the idea. Vittorio testified that he never seriously 
considered murder, nor did he ever consider giving Davis a 
gun. 
 
After that night, Vittorio and his confederates began to 
distance themselves from Sabol. On January 26, 1994, 
McManus told Sabol that he could not sign a lease for the 
warehouse needed for the import/export business because 
he had to work and because of a "serious problem." Vittorio 
told Sabol that a "minor" problem had developed. On 
January 27, 1994, Vittorio called Sabol and told him to 
return the money he'd received from Vittorio only three 
days earlier. Vittorio and the others also stopped using 
their cell phones for illicit business. 
 
Sabol, sensing his opportunity slipping away, attempted 
to convince Vittorio of his trustworthiness. They talked on 
the phone on February 1 and February 18. Ultimately, 
Vittorio told Sabol that he had been informed that Sabol 
was working for the government. He suggested that there 
was a "crooked" FBI agent involved. This immediately 
triggered an FBI investigation into the source of the leak, as 
a result of which the Lanteris' phone was tapped. 
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Vittorio eventually told Sabol that Davis was the source 
of the information. Sabol thereupon explained that Davis 
hated him because of his former relationship with Pelatti. 
By the end of the February 18 conversation, Vittorio was 
almost positive that Davis had lied to him out of 
resentment and jealousy. 
 
Sabol apparently contacted Pelatti that day. Pelatti 
informed Sabol that Davis had told her that he would do 
"everything in [his] power" to get Sabol back in jail. She 
also said that Davis told her that Sabol was out on work 
release and involved in illegal activities. At this point, Davis 
tried to reconcile with Pelatti and perceived Sabol as a 
threat. 
 
On March 2, 1994, Davis once again contacted Vittorio, 
trying to convince him that Sabol was an informant. 
Vittorio dodged his calls, but ultimately the two met once 
again. Davis reiterated his earlier claims and suggested that 
Vittorio was on audio and videotape committing crimes with 
Sabol. He described his knowledge of Sabol's status as 
"gospel" and once again suggested that Vittorio should give 
him a gun. Davis was extremely drunk, at least by the end 
of the meeting. Vittorio was still unsure about Sabol; he 
sought a face-to-face meeting, believing that if Sabol were 
really an informant he would refuse such a meeting 
because of the danger to his safety. Sabol's handlers 
refused a face-to-face meeting on exactly those grounds. 
 
In light of Vittorio's continuing reluctance to trust Sabol, 
Customs terminated its Giampa Crew investigation in April 
1994. Indictments against members of the Crew came down 
in August 1994. Vittorio testified that, were it not for Davis, 
he would have continued to engage in illegal activities with 
Sabol, increasing his criminal liability in the resultant trial. 
 
As a result of the FBI investigation into the leak about 
Sabol, Davis was charged with four different crimes 
comprising eleven counts: one count of obstruction of 
justice, one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, two 
counts of witness tampering, and seven counts of using a 
telephone in aid of an unlawful act, specifically receiving a 
benefit for the violation of his official duty as a police 
officer. After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts. 
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The District Court sentenced him to forty-five months' 
imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, and a 
$550 special assessment. 
 
Because Davis was convicted after a jury trial, we must 
defer to the jury's verdict and view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government. See United States v. 
Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 1998). If there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 
have based its verdict, we should affirm. See United States 
v. Obialo, 23 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1994). The jury may make 
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented; the 
evidence need not unequivocally point to the defendant's 
guilt as long as it permits a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 
1084, 1129 (3d Cir. 1990). Insufficiency of the evidence 
claims, in particular, place a heavy burden on a defendant. 
See United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
II. The Counts of Conviction 
 
A. Obstruction of Justice 
 
Count 2 of the indictment charged obstruction of justice 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1503. That law reads in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any 
       threatening letter or communication, influences, 
       obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
       obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, 
       shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 
       more than five years, or both. 
 
In order to violate S 1503, a defendant must have notice or 
knowledge of the pendency of some judicial proceeding 
constituting the "administration of justice." See United 
States v. Nelson, 852 F.2d 706, 710 (3d Cir. 1988). The 
District Court ruled that there were two possible judicial 
proceedings that Davis might have obstructed: the grand 
jury investigation into the Giampa Crew and the wiretap 
investigation. Though there is some confusion on this point, 
we presume that the jury would have considered the 
Customs wiretap rather than the later FBI wiretap 
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investigation into the source of the "leak" about Sabol's 
status.1 
 
The verdict form provided to the jury separated the 
"grand jury obstruction" from the "wiretap obstruction" and 
allowed the jury to find Davis guilty or not guilty separately, 
and repeated this for the conspiracy counts. The jury found 
Davis guilty of both "grand jury obstruction" and "wiretap 
obstruction." Therefore, while we conclude that S 1503 does 
not prohibit "wiretap obstruction," thus invalidating Davis's 
conviction therefor, we must also evaluate the sufficiency of 
the evidence of "grand jury obstruction." 
 
1. Wiretap Obstruction 
 
As a foundation for this charge, Customs Agent James 
Delia testified that the Giampa Crew wiretaps were reviewed 
every ten days by the district court that authorized them. 
Davis does not contest this, but argues that a wiretap is 
not a "pending judicial proceeding" within the meaning of 
S 1503. This is an issue of first impression in the federal 
courts. We conclude that the wiretap was at bottom an 
element of the Customs investigation and that it could not 
be a "pending judicial proceeding" within the scope of the 
statute. 
 
Courts have repeatedly held that an investigation 
simpliciter is not enough to trigger S 1503. For example, 
intentionally interfering with the execution of a search 
warrant by warning its target to conceal or dispose of 
evidence does not involve a pending judicial proceeding and 
therefore falls outside of S 1503. See United States v. 
Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982). Investigation by 
agents of the Treasury Department "or some other like 
instrumentality" of the United States does not constitute a 
pending proceeding. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 
789, 792 (3d Cir. 1942); see also United States v. Simmons, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We do so because Davis's acts indicated that he surmised the 
existence of the Customs wiretap, and he interfered with its success. By 
contrast, there was no evidence that he had any idea that the FBI 
wiretap existed, and the government did not argue that his acts 
interfered with its success. It was evident in context that the charged 
"wiretap obstruction" involved the Customs investigation, just as the 
"grand jury obstruction" did. 
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591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he obstruction of an 
investigation that is being conducted by the FBI, or by any 
similar governmental agency or instrumentality, does not 
constitute a S 1503 violation because such agencies or 
instrumentalities are not judicial arms of the government 
`administering justice.' "). Even probation supervised by 
court-appointed officers does not constitute a pending 
proceeding. See Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744 (9th 
Cir. 1958). Thus a wiretap, which is generally part of an 
investigation conducted by agents of the executive branch, 
would seem to fall within Perlstein's and Simmons's 
description of investigations that are insufficient to invoke 
S 1503. 
 
The government nonetheless argues that a wiretap 
investigation may constitute a judicial proceeding within 
the meaning of S 1503 where it is monitored actively by a 
federal district court, citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 
U.S. 593 (1995), and United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 
676 (3d Cir. 1975). However, Aguilar does not support the 
government's claim. Indeed, in that case, the government 
charged the defendant's wiretap-related conduct under a 
separate statutory provision that prohibits revealing the 
existence of a wiretap, 18 U.S.C. S 2232(c); his S 1503 
obstruction charge related to conduct specifically involving 
a grand jury. 
 
The government's theory is drawn from our caselaw, 
which has heretofore focused on when a grand jury 
investigation progresses to a stage where it can be said to 
be "pending." Describing the level of involvement a grand 
jury must have with an investigation to triggerS 1503, we 
wrote: 
 
       Appellant would have us adopt a rigid rule that a grand 
       jury proceeding is not "pending" until a grand jury has 
       actually heard testimony or has in some way taken a 
       role in the decision to issue the subpoena. He offers no 
       authority for such a rule, and we are not inclined to 
       adopt it. Appellant is correct in his observation that a 
       grand jury subpoena may become an instrumentality of 
       an investigative agency, without meaningful judicial 
       supervision. Nevertheless, the remedy against potential 
       abuses is not to establish a rule, easily circumvented, 
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       by which some formal act of the grand jury will be 
       required to establish "pendency." The remedy is rather 
       to continue to inquire, in each case, whether the 
       subpoena is issued in furtherance of an actual grand 
       jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently 
       contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand 
       jury. 
 
Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 
The government seizes upon the phrase "judicial 
supervision" to argue that, because the wiretap was subject 
to judicial supervision, it is sufficiently analogous to a 
grand jury investigation to qualify as a "pending judicial 
proceeding." The flaw in the government's argument is that 
judicial supervision is not the test; the test is whether there 
is a judicial proceeding. Walasek considered the role of the 
grand jury in investigations, and we decline to read one 
phrase in that decision as authorizing a sweeping 
expansion in the concept of "pending judicial proceedings," 
one for which the government has no other support. 
 
Fundamentally, a wiretap order is an investigative 
method used by the executive branch, not an element of 
the judicial process. See United States v. Giordano, 416 
U.S. 505 (1974) (discussing the history of wiretapping 
regulation). Judicial supervision pursuant to Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. SS 2510-2520, does not make wiretaps a function of 
the judicial branch, but rather ensures that wiretaps-- 
searches--are carried out within the confines of the Fourth 
Amendment. See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
 
We conclude that a wiretap order is more like a search 
warrant than it is like a grand jury and that its pendency 
does not constitute the "administration of justice" within 
the meaning of S 1503. See Brown, 688 F.2d at 598. It 
follows that Davis cannot be convicted of violatingS 1503 
for intentionally interfering with a wiretap. 
 
2. Grand Jury Obstruction 
 
A grand jury investigation clearly qualifies as a pending 
judicial proceeding under S 1503. See United States v. 
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Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993). The District Court, 
in its written opinion upon Davis's sentencing, found that 
there was a pending grand jury investigation into organized 
crime and the Giampa Crew in particular at the time of 
Davis's acts. However, the trial record is nearly barren of 
any evidence of this fact. The government identifies one 
piece of evidence in support of its contention--the 
testimony of Agent Delia, who testified that, before 
obtaining the wiretap order of January 13, 1994, Customs 
subpoenaed subscriber information and toll records for a 
number of customers from NYNEX. But Agent Delia did not 
testify that a grand jury was actually in the process of 
investigating the people whose records were subpoenaed or 
that the subpoena issued in furtherance of a presently 
contemplated presentation of evidence before a grand jury. 
 
As in many districts in modern times, a grand jury is 
always empaneled in the District of New Jersey, which 
comprises the entire state of New Jersey. For that very 
reason, the mere existence of a grand jury in a district does 
not trigger S 1503; the grand jury must have some 
relationship to the investigation that is obstructed. See 
Nelson, 852 F.2d at 711. Nor is the issuance of a subpoena 
automatically proof of a pending grand jury investigation. 
As we wrote in Nelson: 
 
       Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a) provides for issuance of 
       subpoenas "signed and sealed but otherwise blank to a 
       party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before 
       it is served." Because these subpoenas are issued 
       without meaningful judicial oversight, the pendency of 
       a grand jury investigation cannot be determined from 
       their face alone. Not every investigation in which grand 
       jury subpoenas are used ripens into a pending grand 
       jury investigation for purposes of 18 U.S.C. S 1503. 
 
Id. 
 
Thus, the government must show something more than 
that a grand jury exists in the district and that subpoenas 
have issued in order to prove that a judicial proceeding is 
pending. We have refused to make rigid rules about how 
the connection between an investigation and a grand jury 
must be shown so as to avoid meaningless formality, see 
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Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678, but the record in this case is 
devoid of any evidence of such a connection. There is no 
testimony that the subpoena was issued in furtherance of 
an ongoing or presently contemplated presentation of 
evidence to the grand jury. We cannot, consistent with our 
precedent, find Agent Delia's testimony about the subpoena 
sufficient to sustain Davis's conviction. 
 
There is another fundamental flaw in the government's 
case. A person who lacks knowledge or notice of a pending 
proceeding necessarily lacks the intent to obstruct that 
proceeding. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599; Pettibone v. 
United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206 (1893). The Aguilar Court 
explained that recent decisions of the appellate courts have 
placed certain boundaries on S 1503's apparently broad 
sweep. For example, the defendant's action "must be with 
an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it 
is not enough that there be an intent to influence some 
ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent 
of the court's or grand jury's authority." Aguilar, 515 U.S. 
at 599 (citing Brown, 688 F.2d at 598)."[I]f the defendant 
lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the 
judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to 
obstruct." Id. 
 
The government concedes that there is no record 
evidence that Davis had actual knowledge of a grand jury 
proceeding, but argues that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction on the ground that Davis inferred that 
a grand jury investigation was pending. Davis knew that 
Sabol had been convicted in Georgia on serious drug 
charges and was facing a twenty-year prison term. He 
received assurances from a FBI agent that Sabol would 
serve a lengthy sentence. In light of the fact that Davis was 
a police officer, the District Court found that there was a 
sufficient basis to conclude that Davis knew or believed 
that Sabol was only out of prison because he was an 
informant or cooperating witness in some federal 
investigation. Indeed, Davis communicated this belief to 
Michael and Vittorio, and, in the District Court's view, the 
jury could take him at his word, even though he later 
claimed that he was just bluffing to get Sabol out of his life. 
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The District Court concluded that Davis's failure to take 
proper police action from December 25, 1993 (when hefirst 
learned about Sabol's link to Vittorio), through March 4, 
1994, justified an inference that Davis knew that Sabol was 
involved in an ongoing investigation. The District Court 
believed that Davis should have reported Sabol and 
Vittorio's illegal activities to his superiors, and that, when 
he did not, a jury could infer that he believed that Sabol 
was working for the government.2 At the very least, the 
District Court held, the jury could have found that Davis 
was willfully blind to the likelihood that Sabol was involved 
in an investigation. Moreover, the jury could have 
concluded that Davis knew that his actions had the natural 
and probable effect of interfering with a federal 
investigation. As Vittorio testified, but for Davis's actions, 
he and other members of the Giampa crew would have 
continued to deal with Sabol. 
 
The District Court's reasoning is sound, but it fails to go 
far enough to show Davis's knowledge of a grand jury 
investigation. There was no evidence that Davis concluded 
that Sabol was involved in a grand jury-based investigation. 
Agent Geer and Davis's superior, Larry Wirsing, both 
testified that a police officer would likely conclude that a 
person in Sabol's situation was or had been an informant. 
Both men formed the impression that Davis had reached 
this conclusion, though nothing explicit was said. But 
informants and investigations exist without grand juries. 
We cannot find in this record a shred of evidence that 
Sabol's status as an informant would have led Davis to 
conclude that Sabol was involved in an investigation related 
to a pending grand jury proceeding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court also noted that Davis reported his contacts with 
Vittorio to his supervisor, Larry Wirsing, on March 4, 1994. At that 
point, Wirsing and Davis contacted FBI Agent John Truslow. The court 
found that the jury could have viewed Davis's contacts with authorities 
as another attempt to rid himself of Sabol's presence. While this 
behavior is probative of Davis's underlying motive, it is inconsistent 
with 
a belief that Sabol was an informant; if Sabol were an informant, the 
government would not have any reason to rearrest Sabol for associating 
with Vittorio. 
 
                                13 
  
In United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641 (1st Cir. 
1996), the defendant took a number of acts to cover up 
evidence of hate crimes. The evidence clearly showed that 
he was aware of an FBI investigation into the crimes. The 
court, after scouring the record, found no evidence that the 
defendant knew or had notice of the pending grand jury 
proceeding. The government offered two pieces of evidence 
to meet its burden. The first was a misstatement by the 
defendant that he expected the FBI investigator to return 
"with a subpoena or search warrant," when it was clear 
that he meant to say "search warrant." In addition to 
finding that this was an irrelevant misstatement, the court 
also held that, even if the defendant was referring to a 
subpoena, there was no way to infer from this statement 
that he knew that a grand jury proceeding was underway, 
rather than merely a future possibility. See id. at 650. The 
government's second piece of evidence was similar to the 
government's evidence in this case: A witness testified that 
the defendant knew that the crimes were under 
"investigation." The court found that "we see no way the 
jury could have inferred that the investigation was by a 
grand jury rather than by the FBI." Id. Frankhauser, which 
we find persuasive, strongly supports Davis's argument, as 
it clearly distinguishes simple awareness of a federal 
investigation from knowledge of a pending judicial 
proceeding. 
 
The only relevant case from this circuit involves police 
officers who beat a civilian to death and then took actions 
to cover up their misbehavior. See United States v. 
Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1987). The defendants 
argued that there was no evidence that they could have 
foreseen that federal judicial proceedings were in the offing 
when they committed their obstructive conduct. We found 
that the defendants, ten- and twenty-five-year veterans of 
the New Jersey State Police, could, by reason of their 
positions, be expected to know that federal grand jury 
investigations often follow when an arrestee dies 
suspiciously in police custody. See id. at 794 n.23. By 
contrast, we do not think that a police officer, particularly 
a transit police officer, should ordinarily expect that an 
informant is involved with a grand jury investigation, and 
the government offered no testimony to the contrary. Intent 
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to influence an investigation, which the evidence clearly 
supports, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under 
S 1503. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. 
 
The government's proof in this case is deficient in two 
respects: First, it failed to show that the NYNEX subpoena 
was issued pursuant to a presently contemplated 
presentation of evidence to a grand jury. Second, it failed to 
show that Davis had the requisite knowledge that a grand 
jury investigation, as opposed to an investigation by federal 
agents, was pending. Davis's conviction on this count must 
therefore be reversed. 
 
B. Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice 
 
Count 1 of the indictment charged conspiracy to obstruct 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371. The sufficiency of the 
evidence in a conspiracy prosecution requires close 
scrutiny. See United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 
(3d Cir. 1996). In order to prove a conspiracy to obstruct 
justice, the government must establish that there was an 
agreement whose object was to obstruct justice, that the 
defendant knowingly joined it, and that at least one overt 
act was committed in furtherance of the object of the 
agreement. See United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 
1368 (6th Cir. 1994). Circumstantial evidence may be used 
to prove all the elements. See United States v. Kapp, 781 
F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). It is the first element--the 
existence vel non of an agreement to obstruct justice--that 
is in issue here.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The lack of evidence that a grand jury proceeding was pending is not 
dispositive on this count. In Perlstein, there was a conspiracy 
surrounding an illegal still. The conspiracy to suppress evidence and 
keep potential witnesses away from any investigating agency began more 
than two years before any judicial proceeding began. The indictment 
alleged overt acts both before and after the grand jury began to 
investigate. We assumed that the substantive offense of obstruction of 
justice could not have been committed at the inception of the conspiracy, 
but held that the defendants could still be charged with conspiracy to 
obstruct justice to be administered in the federal courts in the future. 
We suggested that conspirators who "expect or fear" that federal 
proceedings will be instituted can be prosecuted for conspiracy to 
obstruct justice. Perlstein, 126 F.2d at 795. 
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The District Court ruled that the evidence that Davis had 
informed Vittorio, Michael, and Maria of the Customs 
investigation and of Sabol's status as a confidential 
informant was sufficient to establish that he conspired with 
others to obstruct justice. The evidence spins out as 
follows: Michael and Maria had a relationship with Vittorio, 
and Davis first convinced them that Sabol was an 
informant, then got them to arrange a meeting between 
Davis and Vittorio. Davis provided Michael and Vittorio with 
information about Sabol's Georgia conviction, including the 
names of an FBI agent and an AUSA involved in the case, 
and told Vittorio that Sabol had received a twenty-year 
sentence, making it impossible for him to be out on work 
release. He told Vittorio that Sabol was cooperating with the 
government and that the cell phones that Sabol gave to 
Vittorio, McManus, and Giampa were tapped. The taped 
conversations from January 25 to March 2 corroborated 
Vittorio and Michael's testimony. 
 
It is clear that the parties involved in this intrigue had 
different motives. Vittorio wanted to protect his 
confederates and himself; Davis wanted to hurt Sabol; 
Michael wanted to please Maria by helping her brother with 
his personal problems, and he also wanted to protect his 
childhood friend. Davis contends that this disproves a 
conspiracy. We disagree. If they all agreed to interfere with 
a pending judicial proceeding, they are guilty of conspiracy. 
That is the difference between motive and intent. 
 
A conspiracy requires agreement between at least two 
people to the illegal object of the conspiracy, though other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
It is unclear to what extent this 1942 decision survives Aguilar, since 
much of the conduct alleged in Perlstein probably would fail Aguilar's 
nexus test, which requires that an obstructive act be likely to interfere 
with a grand jury rather than simply likely to interfere with an 
investigation. More importantly, however, Perlstein concerned a situation 
in which a jury could find that the defendants contemplated a federal 
investigation, and the defendants admitted that they knew of the grand 
jury investigation once it began. See Perlstein, 126 F.2d at 795. 
Perlstein 
does not change the requirement that there has to be some proof that 
the conspirators knew of or anticipated a grand jury investigation. 
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participants need not be indicted. See United States v. 
Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1150 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Krasovich, 819 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1987). The critical 
flaw in the government's case is that there is no evidence in 
the record that any of Davis's alleged coconspirators had 
the necessary awareness of a pending or threatened judicial 
proceeding. In United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 
1980), we reversed a conspiracy conviction because, while 
there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant 
violated the substantive law, there was insufficient evidence 
of his alleged coconspirators' knowledge. "[W]hen knowledge 
is an essential element of the underlying substantive 
offense, it must be proven that all co-conspirators possess 
the requisite knowledge." Id. at 146. That is, a person 
cannot conspire with himself; at least two conspirators 
must have sufficient knowledge in order for there to be a 
conspiracy. 
 
Molt's requirement is not met here. The government relied 
on Davis's status as a police officer to argue that he was 
aware of the pendency of a judicial proceeding. We have 
already rejected that conclusion, and none of the other 
alleged coconspirators were police officers. Two actually 
testified: Vittorio and Michael. Both testified for the 
government, though Michael was something of a hostile 
witness, and neither testified about his knowledge of a 
pending or foreseen judicial proceeding. While Vittorio was 
clearly a wrongdoer, and Michael and Maria no doubt knew 
that Davis's actions were not legitimate, we cannotfind any 
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude 
that they conspired to obstruct a judicial proceeding. Cf. 
Schramm, 75 F.3d at 160 (a defendant could not be 
convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud where there 
was no evidence that the defendant knew of the mail fraud, 
though he knew of many other illegal acts by his alleged 
coconspirators). Therefore, Davis's conspiracy conviction 
must also be reversed. 
 
C. Use of a Telephone in Furtherance of an Unlawful Act 
 
Counts 5-11 charged Davis with use of a telephone in aid 
of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1952, which 
provides in relevant part that 
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       [w]hoever . . . uses any facility in interstate or foreign 
       commerce, with intent to . . . promote, manage, carry 
       on, or facilitate the promotion, management, 
       establishment, or carrying on of any unlawful activity, 
       and thereafter performs or attempts to perform [any of 
       the acts specified commits an offense against the 
       United States]. 
 
The "unlawful activity" charged is a violation of New York 
Penal Law S 200.25, receiving reward for official 
misconduct: 
 
       A public servant is guilty of receiving reward for official 
       misconduct in the second degree when he solicits, 
       accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another 
       person for having violated his duty as a public servant. 
 
Under New York law, "benefit" is defined to include "any 
gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any gain 
or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or 
consent of the beneficiary." N.Y. Penal LawS 10.00(17) 
(McKinney 1988), and the court so instructed the jury. The 
law does not require an agreement between the two parties, 
as the law against bribery does; it only requires a past 
violation of duty and a solicitation or acceptance of a 
benefit for the violation. 
 
The critical issue is whether Davis, a New York police 
officer at the relevant times, solicited a "benefit" within the 
meaning of the statute. The government's theory was that 
any harm to Sabol benefited Davis, whether in the form of 
Sabol's return to prison or Sabol's murder. Davis made a 
phone call to Pelatti's residence on February 18, 1994, that 
suggested that he perceived Sabol's presence as impeding 
his attempt to reconcile with Pelatti, and the government 
argues that his hope of ending Sabol's newfound freedom 
was a sufficient "benefit." 
 
Although the New York Court of Appeals has not 
construed Penal Law S 200.25, the extant case law suggests 
that the government's theory of benefit goes too far. In 
People v. Hyde, 141 N.Y.S. 1089 (App. Div. 1913), the 
defendant, who had authority to deposit city money in 
banks, asked a bank manager to extend a loan to a friend 
of his, in return for which the defendant promised that he 
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would increase the amount of city funds on deposit at the 
manager's bank. He was charged with receiving a bribe. 
The court concluded that he could not be convicted of that 
crime because there was no showing of any "personal 
advantage" to him. 
 
The Hyde court rejected a prosecution theory similar to 
that proffered in this case, which is that the defendant's 
request for something is proof enough that getting it would 
be a "benefit" to him: 
 
       The People . . . contend[ ] that the mere fact that Robin, 
       for the Northern Bank, acceded to defendant's request 
       that that bank should make the loan desired by the 
       Carnegie Trust Company, of itself constituted a bribe 
       and was manifestly a personal advantage and thing of 
       value to defendant, and so the court charged as matter 
       of law. It is quite clear that this position is untenable. 
       It is not to be disputed that . . . what is commonly 
       known by the collective word "bribe," is something 
       more than the personal satisfaction arising from the 
       gratification of a wish. There must be something more 
       flowing to the person who asks the favor--something of 
       value to him, not necessarily of pecuniary or intrinsic 
       value, but value in the sense of a personal advantage 
       of some sort. The word "advantage" must be given its 
       commonly accepted and natural meaning of something 
       accruing to the benefit of the person receiving it. 
 
        . . . . [A bribe] must consist of something real, 
       substantial and of value to the receiver, as 
       distinguished from something imaginary, illusive, or 
       amounting to nothing more than the gratification of a 
       wish or hope on his part. 
 
Id. at 1093 (emphasis added). Hyde is still commonly cited 
in prosecutions under section 200.25 and related laws. 
 
The most recent relevant case is People v. Feerick, 671 
N.Y.S.2d 13 (App. Div. 1998). The majority sustained 
convictions under section 200.25 where the defendants, 
who were police officers, had committed various abuses of 
authority in their search for a lost police radio. The majority 
concluded that the return of the radio was "a specific, 
personal benefit to these defendants as well as a benefit to 
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the Police Department." Id. at 21-22. The radio was being 
used by drug dealers in the area both to taunt the police 
and to monitor their activity, causing the officers 
embarrassment and jeopardy. See id. at 22. The case 
produced a vigorous dissent, which argued that the radio 
was only tenuously connected to the officers and that the 
enjoyment of its return was an insufficient benefit under 
the statute. 
 
The government argues that the majority opinion in 
Feerick supports its theory because retrieving the radio 
offered psychic benefits to the officers--the satisfaction of 
getting the radio back. Similarly, it argues, telling Vittorio 
about Sabol offered Davis the psychic benefit of harming 
Sabol. But Feerick did not turn on the defendants' 
nonpecuniary motives for seeking the radio; under the 
statute, a public servant is guilty if he solicits an item with 
de minimis market value but great personal value. The 
question is whether we can find anything sufficiently well- 
defined here that we might identify as a "benefit." 
 
Other cases emphasize that a "benefit" must be definite 
in some way, although it need not be tangible. In People v. 
Dolan, 576 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991), the defendant, a 
police officer, was accused of attempted bribery and 
attempted bribe receiving for threatening to stop 
transporting prisoners of a separate police jurisdiction to 
the County Jail unless the Sheriff of the other jurisdiction 
agreed to limit investigations by his department in the 
defendant's jurisdiction. The prosecution argued that the 
"benefit" sought by the defendant was "a lessening of the 
possibility of discovery of alleged drug use by defendant 
and his friends." Id. at 904. The court rejected this theory 
and dismissed the charge. The court found that the benefit 
was not "real, substantial and of value," but was rather 
"imaginary, illusive or amounting to nothing more than the 
gratification of a wish or hope." Id. (citing Hyde). 
 
The Dolan court also dismissed a charge that the 
defendant received a benefit from agreeing to refrain from 
prosecuting a woman. The alleged benefit was that, in 
return for his forbearance, she would become a confidential 
police informant. The prosecution argued that the"benefit" 
was that the defendant got a personal relationship with the 
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informant so that she would give him information about 
undercover Sheriff's operations relating to drug use by him 
and his friends. The court found that "such a benefit would 
be highly speculative and consist only of a remote wish or 
an illusive hope on his part." Id. 
 
In People v. Esposito, 554 N.Y.S.2d 16 (App. Div. 1990), 
the chief of the Metro North Railroad Police conducted an 
unauthorized criminal record check on a company 
employee, in violation of his duty as a public servant. The 
alleged "benefit" was the utility to his employer of knowing 
relevant information, but the court found that this was too 
ill-defined to fall within the statutory prohibition. Likewise, 
in People v. Cavan, 376 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1975), the 
defendant was charged with bribery when, on his arrest, he 
offered to assist the police in catching drug dealers in 
return for leniency. The court held that 
 
       the benefit must not be so remote, abstract, or 
       theoretical as to create speculation as to its ultimate 
       value to the receiver. In the case at bar, it is doubtful 
       if a vague offer to turn State's evidence, without 
       anything further, constitutes such a benefit in the 
       statutory sense. 
 
Id. at 67. 
 
In People v. Adams, 382 N.Y.S.2d 879 (County Ct. 1976), 
the defendant, a legislator, was part of a committee 
studying off-track betting. He prevailed upon an employee 
of a firm that had made a formal presentation to the 
committee to ghost-write a final report for the committee. 
The court found that the defendant had not received a 
"benefit" within the meaning of the penal law: 
 
       "The gist of the crime of bribery is the wrong done to 
       the people by corruption in the public service." Thus, 
       the public servant who agrees to and does manipulate 
       events, not to benefit himself or a third party, but for 
       the personal satisfaction of commanding obedience, is 
       said to receive no bribe. 
 
Id. at 881 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court 
found that the supposed "benefit" was too nebulous to 
support a charge of receiving reward for official misconduct, 
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in that little credit would redound to him for the 
committee's report and there was no evidence that he 
benefited in any "direct material way." 
 
We believe that the "benefit" here is too gossamer to fall 
within section 200.23. The government's theory would 
convert all violations of duty that involve at least one other 
person into violations of this statute. Under that approach, 
if an officer harasses a citizen, he or she receives the 
pleasure of having harassed the citizen, and that "benefit" 
comes (however unwillingly) from the citizen. If an officer 
declines to arrest someone when an arrest should occur, 
that person receives a benefit, and the benefit would be 
"pursuant to [the officer's] desire and consent," within the 
prohibition of the statute. (The statute does not require any 
particular relationship between the officer and the person 
benefited, so long as the benefit accrues pursuant to the 
officer's desire and consent.) Essentially, this theory 
converts Davis's violation of his duty into a "benefit" by 
virtue of his desire to violate his duty and his hope for 
satisfaction from doing so. 
 
Where the alleged benefit consists of an intangible course 
of conduct, we think that it must be sufficiently specific to 
constitute a clearly defined and direct advantage to the 
defendant, or to a third party in whom he has some 
interest. Compare Dolan, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (alleged 
benefit of lessened possibility of discovery of the defendant's 
other misconduct was insufficiently specific to fall within 
the statute), with People v. Hochberg, 404 N.Y.S.2d 161, 
167 (App. Div. 1978) (a person's agreement not to run 
against the defendant in a primary election was a 
sufficiently direct benefit to constitute "personal advantage" 
to the defendant). It was the government's own theory that 
Davis wanted Sabol out of his life and did not care how, 
whether the mechanism was: (1) that Sabol's cooperation 
failed to produce results so that Sabol would return to 
prison; (2) that Sabol would be charged with violating his 
parole; or (3) that Sabol would be killed. Davis had no 
specific plan. We recognize that New York does not require 
a tangible benefit in order to find a violation of section 
200.25, but we believe that the claimed benefit in this case 
is so intangible and speculative as to fall outside the reach 
of the statute. 
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The government has, however, a narrower theory, which 
it also argued to the jury: Davis wanted Vittorio to give him 
a gun in return for his damning information. Although the 
issue is close, we think that this is too tenuous a ground 
on which to uphold Davis's conviction. The link between 
the gun and the violation of duty is far more attenuated 
than what the New York courts seem willing to accept. In 
Feerick, for example, the only way for the officers to get 
what they wanted was to get the radio, while here receiving 
the gun was an incremental step in a possible plan to shoot 
Sabol, one of the least likely ways in which Davis could be 
rid of Sabol. The request was not part of an actual 
attempted murder, and it remained entirely hypothetical. 
 
Moreover, Davis's request for a gun was not necessarily 
tied to his violation of duty, nor was it in any way tied to 
his status as a police officer. If Vittorio had already known 
about Sabol's status, Davis could just as readily have asked 
for the gun, and Vittorio would have had as much reason 
to give it to him to "take care" of Sabol. In this instance, 
Davis acted like an obsessed person, not a corrupt police 
officer. Thus, we conclude that Davis's convictions for 
violating S 1952 must be set aside. 
 
D. Witness Tampering 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Davis was also charged with witness tampering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b): 
 
       Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, 
       threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or 
       attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct 
       toward another person, with intent to . . . hinder, 
       delay, or prevent the communication to a law 
       enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
       information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be fined 
       under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, 
       or both. 
 
Unlike S 1503, S 1512 does not require an official 
proceeding to be pending or imminent at the time of the 
offense. A reasonable belief that the named witness will 
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communicate information to a law enforcement officer is 
enough to create liability under the statute. See United 
States v. Kozak, 438 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1971). As 
discussed above, a reasonable jury clearly could have found 
that Davis believed that Sabol was communicating with the 
authorities. 
 
To be criminally liable, the defendant must know that his 
conduct has the natural and probable effect of interfering 
with the witness's communication, whether or not it 
succeeds. See United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 344 
(4th Cir. 1992). Davis indicated that he wanted Vittorio to 
stop dealing with Sabol and warned Vittorio that Sabol was 
"setting him up." He also hoped that Vittorio would kill 
Sabol. The government argues that the natural, foreseeable, 
and probable consequence of Davis's acts was that Sabol 
would be killed or otherwise prevented from gaining and 
conveying information. Although we find the government's 
theory extremely broad, we conclude that Davis's conduct 
in this case falls within the statutory meaning of "corrupt 
persuasion." 
 
Simply interfering with the flow of information to the 
government is not enough to constitute witness tampering. 
Suppose that Vittorio became suspicious of Sabol on his 
own and stopped talking to him, thus decreasing the 
amount of information Sabol could communicate to the 
government. By the government's theory, this would 
apparently constitute witness tampering by Vittorio. Or 
hypothesize that Michael tried to dissuade Vittorio from his 
criminal ways, using as one of his arguments the 
proposition that the government had infiltrated the Giampa 
Crew. By the government's theory, this would apparently 
constitute witness tampering by Michael. Indeed, a lawyer's 
instruction to a client not to speak to potential government 
witnesses, including government investigators, would also 
apparently constitute witness tampering by this theory, 
except that the statute excludes lawful, bona fide legal 
services in connection with or anticipation of an official 
proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. S 1515(c). A defendant's husband 
or mother, however, would not fall within this safe harbor 
if he or she advised a defendant to keep silent when 
approached by potential witnesses. 
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Our rejection of the government's broad theory has a 
basis in the statute. Because there is no allegation that 
Davis used misleading conduct,4 intimidation, physical 
force, or threats, we limit our inquiry to whether he 
engaged in "corrupt persuasion" with the relevant intent. 
 
2. Corrupt Persuasion 
 
The Ninth Circuit has held that lying to a witness is not 
corrupt persuasion, though appealing to a witness to avoid 
testifying truthfully in order to protect one's career would 
be. See United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1485-86 
(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 515 U.S. 
593 (1995). United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991), gives more guidance on the meaning of corrupt 
persuasion. Poindexter interpreted 18 U.S.C.S 1505, which 
prohibits obstructing proceedings before congressional 
committees. Poindexter was charged with obstruction of 
justice for lying to Congress, which the government argued 
was "corrupt persuasion." The majority held that the term 
could not be extended to encompass simple lying to a 
congressional committee. 
 
As the court explained, "corruptly" has two possible 
meanings, transitive and intransitive. The transitive 
meaning would involve persuading another by means of 
corruption or bribery, while the intransitive would involve 
persuading "wickedly" or "immorally," that is, with a bad 
motive. Poindexter endorsed the transitive meaning in order 
to avoid what it perceived as a potentially unconstitutional 
vagueness, and also because the other terms in the statute 
were transitive ("by threats," "by force," etc.). It further 
found that "corrupt persuasion" could not be cabined 
simply by saying that the term covered "influencing another 
to act `immorally' or `improperly,' " as that simply 
substitutes one indefinite term for another. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Several courts have held that asking a witness to tell what he knows 
to be a lie is not misleading conduct because there is nothing misleading 
about a request to lie. See, e.g., United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 
546 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1985). 
The government has not identified any way in which Davis's conduct was 
misleading. Indeed, on the government's own theory he told the truth as 
he perceived it: Sabol was an informant. If asking for a lie is not 
misleading to the target, surely telling the truth is not. 
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The Poindexter court determined that corrupt persuasion 
is " `corrupting' another person by influencing him to violate 
his legal duty," id. at 379, and that the"core" of the 
statutory prohibition of corrupt persuasion was aimed at a 
person who, "for the purpose of influencing an inquiry, 
influences another person (through bribery or otherwise) to 
violate a legal duty," id. at 385. See also United States v. 
Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (influencing a 
witness to violate her legal duty to testify truthfully 
constituted corrupt persuasion under S 1512(b)). 
 
We approved of Poindexter's reasoning in theS 1512 
context in United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 
1997). Farrell was convicted of witness tampering for 
attempting to dissuade a coconspirator from providing 
information to federal investigators about Farrell's 
involvement in a conspiracy. We reversed his conviction: 
 
       Without any definitional assistance, we find the phrase 
       "corruptly persuades" to be ambiguous. We agree with 
       Farrell that the phrase cannot mean simply "persuades 
       with the intent to hinder communication to law 
       enforcement" because such an interpretation would 
       render the word "corruptly" meaningless. 
 
Farrell, 126 F.3d at 487. While we were confident that 
bribing someone to withhold information or persuading 
someone to provide false information would be corrupt 
persuasion, we declined to define the term more abstractly. 
See id. at 488. Farrell concluded that the statute did not 
cover a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator 
who had a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose 
information about the conspiracy to refrain, in accordance 
with that right, from volunteering information to 
investigators. See id. at 488.5  
 
The government argues that Farrell is distinguishable 
because the defendant in that case was acting in 
furtherance of his own interest in avoiding a coconspirator's 
disclosure of a crime, while here Davis was a malicious 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We declined, however, to resolve whether discouraging the testimony 
of a potential witness who did not possess a Fifth Amendment privilege 
of his or her own would violate S 1512. See Farrell, 126 F.3d at 489 n.3. 
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interloper. While we agree that Davis may have violated 
S 1512(b), see infra, we caution that Davis's malicious 
purpose to expose an informant is insufficient under Farrell 
to justify a conviction: 
 
       We read the inclusion of "corruptly" in S 1512(b) as 
       necessarily implying that an individual can "persuade" 
       another not to disclose information to a law 
       enforcement official with the intent of hindering an 
       investigation without violating the statute, i.e., without 
       doing so "corruptly." Thus, more culpability is required 
       for a statutory violation than that involved in the act of 
       attempting to discourage disclosure in order to hinder 
       an investigation. 
 
Id. at 489. 
 
Davis may be properly convicted under S 1512(b) because 
there was testimony that he suggested that Vittorio should 
kill Sabol and asked Vittorio for a gun so that Davis himself 
could kill Sabol. By suggesting that Vittorio should "do 
something" about Sabol or get Davis a gun, Davis urged 
Vittorio to violate his legal duty not to kill Sabol or aid in 
Sabol's death. This conduct would constitute "corrupt 
persuasion" under the statute. The fact that Davis never 
had direct contact with Sabol is irrelevant, because all that 
is required under S 1512(b) is that a defendant corruptly 
persuade "another person" with the requisite intent. That 
person need not be the witness. Moreover, Vittorio's 
testimony that he was never persuaded to kill Sabol does 
not exonerate Davis. If Davis intended to corruptly 
persuade, his attempt violates the statute.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although Davis does not raise the issue, we note that the District 
Court's instruction on corrupt persuasion does not track Farrell. The 
Court instructed the jury that "[t]he word`corruptly' means having 
improper motive or purpose of obstructing justice." SA at 1426. Farrell 
and Poindexter suggest that this instruction provides insufficient 
guidance to the jury, as anyone with the intent to interfere with an 
investigation has "improper" motives. On remand, the Court should 
clarify that "corrupt persuasion" involves more than an improper motive, 
and includes inducements to violence. 
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III. The Intoxication Instruction 
 
Having decided that there is sufficient evidence for a 
conviction under S 1512(b), we turn to the question whether 
Davis is entitled to a new trial because the District Court 
refused to provide an intoxication instruction concerning 
his specific intent. A defendant is entitled to an instruction 
on his theory of the case where the record contains 
evidentiary support for it. See Government of V.I. v. 
Carmona, 422 F.2d 95, 99 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970). A court errs 
in refusing a requested instruction only if the omitted 
instruction is correct, is not substantially covered by other 
instructions, and is so important that its omission 
prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Smith, 789 
F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1986). We first consider whether Davis 
preserved the issue for appellate review, and then evaluate 
the merits of his request. 
 
A. The Request for Instruction 
 
When Davis's trial counsel initially raised the issue of an 
intoxication charge, the District Court was uncertain that 
such an instruction was required and requested briefing on 
the issue. The record reveals the following exchange on 
March 20, 1998, a Friday: 
 
       Mr. Cascione: I made an additional submission which 
       I gave Mr. Sierra, so if he wishes to cover it during his 
       opportunity for an intoxication charge because I saw 
       some reason for it as the proof came out. 
 
        I will submit it to the Court so that the Court has it 
       and we'll cover it in our charge conference. 
 
       The Court: You better give me law on that. 
 
       Mr. Cascione: That's understood. 
 
       The Court: I need law on that. I'm not sure I see the 
       basis for an intoxication charge here, but you can 
       address that factually and legally. Give me these briefs 
       Monday morning. 
 
Over the weekend, however, there was an unexpected 
early spring snowstorm that disrupted much travel in the 
area; we take judicial notice of the snowstorm. See Elise 
Young & Barbara Williams, North Jersey Gets a Taste of 
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What Might Have Been: Winter Lands a Late Blow, Bergen 
County Record, Mar. 23, 1998, at A1 (stating that up to six 
inches fell in New Jersey, disrupting traffic). On Monday, 
March 23, 1998, defense counsel stated that the inclement 
weather had disrupted his research, and, when specifically 
asked about the intoxication charge, stated: 
 
       I have the submission. I was prepared to give the Court 
       citing from Blackmore [sic]. There is an Eighth Circuit 
       case on it that I was not able to obtain yesterday. 
 
The statement obviously refers to E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, 
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, the veritable "bible" 
on the subject, which virtually every federal district judge 
has in his or her chambers. 
 
The Court rejected the intoxication charge because 
defense counsel had not provided enough support for it: 
 
       I told you I wanted something and you haven't given 
       me anything. The stuff you have given me is not 
       adequate. 
 
        Now, you've got an intoxication argument, you 
       haven't given me the charge, you haven't given me any 
       law on it. I came in early to handle it. . . . 
 
        I know the whole idea behind this is for you to 
       "preserve this" and raise it now so you can bring it up 
       on appeal and I have a real serious problem with that, 
       and I'm going to have to address all this in an opinion 
       with regard to this, which means again I'm going to 
       have to be doing your work and I don't think I should 
       have to do your work. 
 
The District Court never ruled that an intoxication charge 
was not justified by the facts; rather, it apparently rejected 
the charge because of counsel's failure to brief the issue. 
 
The government's appendix contains defense counsel's 
written request to give an intoxication instruction, along 
with excerpts from Devitt & Blackmar relevant to 
intoxication. The government and the defendant cannot 
agree on whether these papers were in fact submitted to the 
District Court.7 We need not resolve the conflicting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The government argues that these papers were never submitted to the 
District Court, and that the Court's subsequent reference to defense 
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accounts, because we conclude that Davis's counsel 
brought the intoxication issue to the Court's attention with 
sufficient clarity to preserve the issue, even assuming that 
he did not provide the Court with any written submission. 
 
The government argues that Davis waived the issue by 
failing to brief it to the District Court. Waiver, however, is 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right. See United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Davis's counsel did not relinquish his request for an 
intoxication instruction, though he failed to supply the 
court with precedent in support of his request. We are 
persuaded that the appropriate inquiry is whether defense 
counsel's acts preserved the issue for appellate review. See 
United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 178-79 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
In general, if an instruction is timely requested, is 
supported by the evidence, and correctly states the law, it 
should be given. See, e.g., United States v. Jerde, 841 F.2d 
818 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 854 
(4th Cir. 1984). However, counsel is required to draw the 
court's attention to a specific instruction, or to a problem 
with an instruction, in order to put the court on notice so 
that a possible error may be corrected before the jury 
begins to deliberate. See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 
993, 1020 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 
676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987). As we have explained: 
 
       The specificity requirement imposes a strict standard 
       on defense counsel, but it is not a mere formalism. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
counsel's Devitt and Blackmar excerpts referred to materials submitted 
in response to other portions of the proposed charge. See SA at 1288 
(District Court refers to excerpts from Devitt & Blackmar and Aguilar 
submitted by defense counsel). The government submits that it included 
the proposed intoxication charge in the appellate record, despite the fact 
that it was not presented to the District Court, in order to avoid any 
appearance of concealing relevant material. Davis's appellate counsel, 
who did not represent Davis at trial, takes the position that the 
instruction was submitted to the Deputy Court Clerk on the morning of 
March 23, 1998, and was properly included in the appellate record. 
Davis's trial counsel offered to submit an affidavit to this effect, but 
we 
have found it unnecessary for him to do so. 
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       Without a clearly articulated objection, a trial judge is 
       not apprised sufficiently of the contested issue and the 
       need to cure a potential error to avoid a new trial. 
 
Government of V.I. v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
At the same time, the requirement that counsel make 
specific requests is not designed to be a trap. Our cases 
suggest that a request for an instruction need only be 
sufficiently clear to enable the trial judge to fairly evaluate 
it. In United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1991), 
for example, one of the government's witnesses had pled 
guilty to receiving the very bribe for which the defendants 
were on trial for giving. We held that the following 
statements constituted a sufficient request for a limiting 
instruction against using the guilty plea as evidence of the 
defendant's guilt: 
 
       [I]f they introduce that specific conviction, we're 
       entitled to an instruction at a later time as far as the 
       weight that should be given that. . . . The fact that he 
       entered a plea to a bribery transaction involving $3,000 
       cannot be used to infer that we were guilty of paying 
       the bribe. 
 
Id. at 114. We note that counsel in Werme did not cite any 
precedent to justify his request. Werme nonetheless found 
that counsel had clearly taken issue with the offered 
evidence and requested a curative instruction. See id. at 
115; see also Russell, 134 F.3d at 178-79 & n.4 (the 
purpose of federal rules governing jury instructions is to 
give a trial court "notice of potential error" and "the 
underlying basis for the objection" rather than to force 
parties to follow formal or technical requirements); United 
States v. Kwong, 14 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1994) ("While 
the objection could certainly have been more focussed, we 
find that it was sufficient to alert the trial court and the 
government to the serious Braxton violation they were 
about to commit."). 
 
The events in this case raise the question of the proper 
allocation of responsibility between lawyer and judge. A 
judge should require counsel to participate in the process 
of crafting instructions. However, the issue here is not 
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arcane. Indeed, not only is the appropriate instruction set 
forth in Devitt & Blackmar, an instantly available source for 
any federal trial judge, but there appears to be no dispute 
as to the substance of the law: Intoxication is a defense 
when a defendant's intoxication prevented him from 
possessing the mental state necessary to commit the crime 
with which he is charged. 
 
On a garden-variety issue such as intoxication, where an 
adequate instruction is available in a standard charge 
book, the trial court cannot leave everything to the lawyers. 
The judge has an immanent obligation to research the law 
and craft an appropriate charge. This obligation cannot be 
avoided by requiring the lawyers to file legal memoranda on 
a pedestrian issue and then considering them not to have 
preserved the issue if they do not. If the requested 
instruction were complex and involved subtle questions of 
law, the situation would be different and the lawyers would 
have the laboring oar, but in this case we are unwilling to 
deem the request unpreserved merely because defense 
counsel did not present the Court with a copy of the Devitt 
& Blackmar charge. 
 
There is a dispute, discussed infra, as to whether the 
record supported the request for an intoxication 
instruction. That is certainly a basis for requiring 
memoranda. However, there was a snowstorm that 
interfered with counsel's ability to present material to the 
District Court. Moreover, that aspect of the matter could 
have been argued on the basis of the record, which was 
fresh in everyone's mind. We do not believe that criminal 
defense counsel who are immersed in trying a complex case 
should be deemed to have failed to preserve an issue of this 
sort for neglecting to produce memoranda over a weekend, 
even without a snowstorm. While far from perfect, defense 
counsel's request was straightforward and required 
consideration on its merits. In these circumstances, we 
conclude that Davis's counsel properly preserved the issue 
for our review by making his request for an intoxication 
instruction clearly and specifically, even though he failed to 
provide precedent in support of the proposed instruction. 
Cf. Russell, 134 F.3d at 178 n.4 (adopting a"flexible, 
common-sense interpretation" of the rules for preserving 
objections to proposed instructions). 
 
                                32 
  
B. Was the Instruction Justified? 
 
All of the charged crimes were specific intent crimes, and 
intoxication can negate specific intent. See United States v. 
Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 303 (3d Cir. 1989). Davis argues 
that he was drunk at the relevant times--his January 25 
and March 2 meetings with Vittorio--and indeed all 
witnesses agree that he was drinking heavily on those 
dates. 
 
Michael testified that, immediately before Davis saw 
Vittorio on January 25, Davis was "ossified . .. . [d]runk 
beyond drunk, slurring, he walked in with two bottles of 
wine." Michael's testimony indicated that Davis was drunk 
and slurring throughout the part of the conversation that 
he witnessed. On his part, Vittorio testified that when he 
first saw Davis on January 25, "he had some jeans on with 
no shirt and he seemed a little disheveled. He seemed very 
paranoid." Vittorio and Davis then went to a bar, Jester's 
Pub in Yonkers, to continue the conversation away from 
Maria and the Lanteris' baby, and it was at the bar that 
Davis suggested that Vittorio "do something about" Sabol 
and that Vittorio should get Davis a gun. Vittorio testified, 
however, that Davis did not seem drunk to him. Davis 
himself testified that he was drinking before he called 
Michael and that he brought bottles of wine to the Lanteris' 
apartment. He described himself as drunk throughout the 
conversation with Vittorio, "rambling," and using "what was 
left of my brain." 
 
Vittorio testified that the March 2 meeting was similar. 
They went to Jester's Pub, where Davis again asked for a 
gun. Davis had more than one drink (vodka and lime) 
during the conversation and Vittorio testified that he 
"already had a few drinks in him before he met me. . . . He 
wasn't staggering, because I know he does drink a lot so he 
probably can handle a few drinks. He was a little buzzed, 
definitely by the time I left by the way he was driving." After 
the discussion, Davis drove Vittorio home, and Vittorio 
testified that "he had a few drinks and he was all over the 
road and I was kind of concerned about him. . . . I 
remember calling [Michael], telling him that Vinnie [Davis] 
was really drunk and I was worried that he might crash 
and kill himself or something . . . ." Finally, Vittorio stated 
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that "Vinnie was very drunk" at the end of their 
conversation. Davis likewise described himself as 
"hammered" and "very, very drunk" on March 2. 
 
In order to justify an intoxication instruction, most 
courts have held that a defendant needs more than 
evidence of intoxication. He also needs some evidence of 
interference with his ability to form the relevant intent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Nacotee, 159 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 225 
(9th Cir. 1987). In Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Carmona, supra, however, we apparently set forth a 
different rule, as we found an intoxication instruction 
required in a felony murder case when the only evidence of 
intoxication was that the defendant had a large amount to 
drink. 
 
The government argues that our Carmona holding was 
dicta because we reversed the defendant's conviction on the 
alternate ground that the jury instructions failed to define 
robbery as a specific intent crime. However, we specifically 
found the jury instructions defective in that they failed to 
explain the materiality of the intoxication evidence. 
Furthermore, the errors in the intoxication charge and the 
robbery charge were interrelated, because they both 
required the jury to be informed about specific intent. We 
rejected the government's claim that, because there was 
evidence only of intoxication and not of interference with 
the defendant's thinking, no intoxication instruction was 
required. See Carmona, 422 F.2d at 99 n.6. We reversed 
because of the "errors in the charge to the jury." Id. at 101. 
 
It may be that our rule is not substantially different than 
that of other circuits, in that it is often difficult to 
determine what might qualify as evidence of interference 
with ability to form intent. Carmona endorses the 
conclusion, justified by much human experience, that 
heavy drinking may interfere with a person's ability to form 
a specific intent. The facts in Carmona--in which the 
defendant was drinking heavily in a bar, left for a few 
minutes, and then returned to rob it--suggested that the 
crime could have occurred without the defendant forming a 
specific intent to rob. 
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At all events, in Carmona, the evidence justifying the 
instruction was weaker than it is here, because the only 
testimony in Carmona was that the defendant was drinking, 
and the witnesses refused to say that he behaved in a 
drunken manner. By contrast, Michael testified that Davis 
was "drunk beyond drunk," and Vittorio testified that Davis 
was drunk and paranoid at their first meeting on January 
25, 1994. Vittorio was so concerned about Davis's drunken 
driving on March 2, 1994, immediately after their second 
meeting, that he called Michael to express his concern. 
While the government notes that a jury could conclude that 
Davis was not drunk at the beginning of the March 2 
conversation, there was also evidence from which a jury 
could conclude that Davis was significantly affected by 
alcohol at the time of the critical statements. 
 
The government argues that there was no need for an 
instruction because Davis's drinking clearly did not 
interfere with his ability to form the specific intent to 
commit the charged crimes. It maintains that Davis's 
scheme evolved over some period of time, and that he 
committed his crimes over many weeks. Despite his 
drunkenness, Davis initiated meetings with Vittorio in order 
to explain to him why he should not trust Sabol. While 
drunk, Davis told Vittorio that Sabol was a "rat," thus 
evidencing that his soused mind retained this crucial fact 
and that he knew that telling Vittorio would further his 
objective. 
 
The evidence plainly showed that Davis had a fairly 
complex plan to eliminate Sabol from his (Davis's) life. Yet 
Davis's plan to eliminate Sabol from his life did not, in the 
main, involve witness tampering; the witness tampering 
was only a small part of the plan, which was in other 
respects not unlawful. As we have explained, an intent to 
expose a person as an informant, while reprehensible, is 
insufficient to constitute "corrupt persuasion" under the 
statute. Thus, Davis's implacable hatred for Sabol and his 
consistent intent, held drunk and sober, to expose Sabol as 
a "rat" was insufficient to make him guilty of witness 
tampering. 
 
To violate the statute, Davis had to intend to corruptly 
persuade. The two instances of corrupt persuasion, on 
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January 25 and March 2--asking for the gun and 
suggesting that Vittorio harm Sabol--did not permeate his 
discussions with Vittorio, and a jury could have believed 
that Davis blurted them out drunkenly without intending 
that his requests should be acted upon. Unlike his hatred 
for Sabol, his acts of corrupt persuasion were not so 
extensive as to make the intoxication defense implausible. 
 
A jury could also find that Davis possessed the requisite 
intent despite his drinking. But, to uphold Davis's 
conviction, we would have to find that the missing 
instruction was harmless error--that "it is highly probable 
that the error did not contribute to the judgment." Murray 
v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 
1998). We cannot say that the error was harmless on this 
record. See also United States v. Logan, 717 F.2d 84, 92 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (reversing for plain error where the trial judge 
had notice of the defense request for an instruction and the 
evidence showed that the instruction was critical to the 
defense's theory). Therefore, we will reverse Davis's 
conviction for witness tampering and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
IV. Evidentiary Issues 
 
Davis claims that the District Court abused its discretion 
in admitting testimony that he had been found guilty by the 
police department of the same acts for which he was on 
trial, and also abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 
other, unrelated misconduct. He contends that this 
evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value 
in contravention of Rule 403. Because we are remanding 
the witness tampering charges for retrial, we will evaluate 
the challenged evidentiary rulings. We will only disturb a 
district court's decision on admissibility for abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 737 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The District Court allowed the prosecution to question 
Davis about his departmental conviction because Davis had 
testified about why he was dismissed from the police 
department on direct examination. He had testified that he 
was dismissed because Vittorio falsely claimed--in a 
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conversation with Michael that was recorded as part of the 
federal investigation and subsequently provided to NYPD 
investigators--that Davis had allowed him (Vittorio) to fire 
Davis's police firearm. (Vittorio now concedes that this was 
a lie.) 
 
The prosecution sought to show that Davis was being 
less than fully truthful about the reasons for his discharge. 
The prosecutor led Davis through a fairly lengthy recitation 
of the non-firearm-related departmental charges against 
him, which largely tracked those before the jury. 8 The court 
ruled that the questions were appropriate to challenge 
Davis's credibility, and instructed the jury to consider them 
only for impeachment purposes at the time of cross- 
examination. 
 
In this case, Davis's answers implicated more than his 
credibility; they informed the jury that another body had 
already found Davis guilty of the conduct charged in the 
indictment, albeit only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
We note in this regard that Davis had not flatly lied when 
he testified that he was discharged over the gun incident, 
as that was one of the reasons for his discharge along with 
his other contacts with Vittorio.9 Thus, while probative of 
Davis's willingness to edit the full truth, the cross- 
examination was more prejudicial than ordinary cross- 
examination about a defendant's truthfulness with respect 
to collateral matters. 
 
The government argues, however, that Davis "opened the 
door" to the challenged questions by testifying on direct 
examination that Vittorio's falsehood got him fired. We 
usually use that phrase in reference to a specific doctrine, 
"curative admissibility," which states that once a party has 
introduced inadmissible evidence that may create a false 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In addition to making essentially the same charges as those before the 
jury, the police department also charged Davis with lying to the FBI 
agents who had investigated the "leak." 
 
9. The challenged questions did not serve to rehabilitate Vittorio, the 
government's witness, as the government apparently conceded that 
Vittorio had lied in the statement relied upon by the NYPD investigators 
and merely sought to show that there were additional reasons justifying 
Davis's discharge. 
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impression, an opposing party may thereafter introduce 
otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain the 
prior evidence. But the government does not argue that 
Davis's direct testimony was inadmissible or explain why it 
needed to rebut Davis's account of his termination. See 
United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Government of V.I. v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1993). Therefore, this is not a case of curative admissibility. 
 
The government may find more solace in the related 
principle of completeness, which states that when a witness 
testifies to part of a conversation, statement, transaction, or 
occurrence, the opposing party may elicit testimony on the 
whole thereof, to the extent that it relates to the same 
subject matter and concerns the specific matter opened up. 
See id. at 188; United States v. Womochil, 778 F.2d 1311 
(8th Cir. 1985) (allowing the government to introduce 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay to rebut a false impression 
caused by defense counsel's elicitation of only part of the 
hearsay). However, it is still unclear why the facts behind 
Davis's termination were relevant to the government's case, 
no matter how incomplete Davis's explanation was. 
 
At all events, the issue before us is whether the line of 
questioning was properly allowed to challenge Davis's 
credibility. We conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in ruling that the prosecutor could ask 
Davis whether there were other reasons for his termination 
in order to show that Davis was unwilling to tell the full 
truth. See United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379, 383 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (noting that the government may, when 
appropriate, explore a defendant's testimony on cross- 
examination in order to impeach him). Given that the jury 
was correctly instructed to consider this testimony only for 
impeachment purposes, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting this line of questioning. 
 
The other challenged testimony relates to Davis's prior 
bad acts. The prosecutor first questioned Davis about a 
forty-four-day suspension that he had received for 
misappropriating departmental gasoline for use in his 
personal vehicle and putting a false name in a gas log. 
Second, he asked Davis about an incident in which Davis 
was found to have taken a subway pass away from a young 
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man and ripped it up. During an Internal Affairs interview, 
Davis denied that he ripped up the pass, but another officer 
found the ripped-up pass and Internal Affairs determined 
that Davis had lied. Third, the prosecutor asked Davis 
about an incident in 1985 in which Davis was charged with 
improperly putting a gun to a prostitute's head. She 
claimed that Davis yelled at her, that she responded 
profanely, and that he then slammed her on the hood of his 
car and put a gun to her head. In response to the 
prosecutor's questions, Davis gave exculpatory accounts of 
his acts in those three instances. 
 
Davis notes that, under Rule 404(b), evidence of other 
crimes or wrongs is inadmissible to prove personal 
disposition, i.e, character. It is only admissible for other 
purposes, including motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. He argues that credibility is not a 
permissible 404(b) exception. However, under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 608(b), specific instances of conduct may be 
inquired into on cross-examination, at the discretion of the 
court, if they are probative of a witness's truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. Rule 608(b) applies because the 
government did not introduce extrinsic evidence about 
these other acts; all it did was ask Davis about them.10 
 
Inquiry into the first two incidents was clearly proper, 
because they went to Davis's truthfulness. See Deary v. 
City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 1993) (questions 
about an incident in which a police officer-witness had 
been disciplined for untruthfulness were appropriate under 
Rule 608(b)). Inquiry into the third incident, involving the 
prostitute, does not appear to be probative of truthfulness 
and therefore it should not have been permitted on cross- 
examination, unless the government explains to the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. A few courts have allowed cross-examination about other bad acts 
under Rule 404(b) to challenge credibility, though we think that the 
correct view is that such questions are allowable under Rule 608. See, 
e.g., United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(allowing questions about other acts of molestation to challenge the 
defendant's credibility under Rule 404(b)); United States v. Chevalier, 1 
F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1993) (same for bank fraud in tax fraud trial; 
court invoked Rule 404(b) but cited only Rule 608(b) cases). 
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Court why it was probative of credibility rather than of a 
tendency to do bad acts. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We will reverse Davis's convictions for obstruction of 
justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and use of a 
telephone in aid of racketeering for insufficiency of the 
evidence. Because we conclude that Davis was entitled to 
an intoxication instruction, we will vacate his conviction on 
two counts of witness tampering and remand those counts 
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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